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Gray further explained what he considered the characteristics of the American way of war. Of the twelve aspects listed, six in particular (e.g. Apolitical, Astrategic, Problem Solving/Optimistic, Technologically Dependent, Impatient and Sensitive to Casualties) have scalar and temporal implications. 13 Another perspective on the American way of war relevant to the discussion of temporal and scalar influences appeared in the paper, "American Military Strategy," where Professor Samuel P. Huntington stated that U.S. strategy and the processes that created it should be reflective of the nature of American society.
14 Likewise, Professor Huntington pointed out that it is the American way to plan to win quickly and fight with overwhelming force. 15 Antulio J.
Echevarria II's article, "Principles of War or Principles of Battle," conjectured that what people call the principles of the new of American way of war--speed, knowledge, jointness, and precision--are also general principles of fighting and of battle. 16 Harlan Ullman's view of the American way of war pointed to two aspects directly associated with American warfare. First, he noted that the revolution in military affairs has systematically transformed American military might, making it more agile, lethal and flexible. 17 In addition, he commented that transformation allowed flexible, swift and lethal forces to execute one of the most remarkable military campaigns in history when in 2003 coalition forces covered of 400 miles in three weeks to capture Baghdad. 18 In still yet another perspective on American warfare, Ralph Peters expressed the point that, in the age of real-time communications and "metastasizing global media," the dominant principle of winning on future battlefields is speed. 19 Peters also indicated that, historically, "Americans are known masters of the quick draw, a fact that is well known by and exploited by our enemies." 20 In each case, speed remains a recurring theme in U.S.
warfare. Even national policies continue to shape an American way of war based in large part on speed and time. Pressures from those policies drive U.S. military services to seek newer, faster and more complex capabilities to achieve battlefield dominance. 21 Clearly, speed is an issue of highest priority as evidenced by the following examples. In 1997, Former Army Chief of Staff Dennis J. Reimer signed a document emphasizing the American Army's need to devise a means of accelerating the speed of movement across a deadly war zone by an order of magnitude to take advantage of the offensive in combat.
Moreover, the document predicted that the union of speed and knowledge would quicken an American commander's divination of an enemy's weaknesses and possibly offset the influences of uncertainty and chance in conflict. 22 In the 1998 release of "Knowledge and Speed: The Annual Report on the Army After Next Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army," Army leaders stressed that an enemy's ability to exploit time in conflict can severely influence an American strategic response to particular situation. Therefore, it would be imperative for U.S. military might to get there first. 23 Four years later in June 2002, shortly after the events of September 11 th , President Bush addressed America's future military leaders at West Point stating that a transformed fighting force is "a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world." 24 Military services appear to be increasingly dependent on speed, and these organizations continue to place a premium on its relative value. The Army's "Field Manual 1: The Army,"
embraces the idea that speed is critical to its operational concept, necessary for maneuver forces to keep the initiative in battle, and vital towards achieving shock and surprise. 25 The
United States Navy looks to speed as an essential component of maritime operations. In "Fleet
Tactics and Costal Combat," Wayne P. Hughes reasons that speed is necessary to win the sea battle within the first few shots of an engagement. 26 The United States Air Force has plans to increase the speed and fidelity of command, control, communications and computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) to create Predictive Battlespace Awareness over the combat area. The desired end state of these capabilities will be "getting a cursor over a target" upon demand. 27 Even U.S. Air Force doctrine is replete with references to speed. The concept of speed clearly underlies the tenets and principles of airpower as an enabling factor.
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One can also see the influences of scalar references in national policies and guidance.
The 2004 National Military Strategy of the United States of America focused repeatedly on the
use of military campaigns to "swiftly defeat the efforts of adversaries" and "rapidly establish / reestablish security conditions" favorable to the United States and its partners. In fact, the document employed the word "swiftly" at least 10 times, used "quickly" 10 additional times, and used "rapidly" 14 times in the span of 38 short pages. 29 Similarly, a scan of the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review located 28 instances of the word "rapidly" within the document.
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Speed has insinuated itself powerfully into the American worldview over many years.
Therefore, it is important to comprehend how Americans arrived at this heavy focus on speed in combat. Is there some cultural basis for this being so, some historical precedent? The answer lies in an understanding of both American culture and the American way of life.
Socio-Political and Psychological Strategic Context for Speed and Time in American Strategic Culture
Today, both temporal and scalar influences are literally reorganizing the "cultural DNA" of American society. As a nation, Americans have become obsessed with notion of speed and all its perceived benefits. This obsession permeates national culture in orders of magnitude ranging from the mundane to the exotic. Fictional characters from pop movie culture quip lines such as "I feel the need…the need.. for speed!" 31 Pharmaceutical commercials barrage viewers with onslaughts of promises for "immediate relief" from the pain of everyday life if they consume that company's product. 32 Computer icons such as Bill Gates talk about how the world will evolve into an entity that manages information technology at the speed of thought, and other vendors such as Intel® continue to build Information Technology that will eventually operate at lightning speeds. 33 In the article "The American Way of War," authors Arthur K. Cebrowski and Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett made the statement that "a defining characteristic of the American Way of War is the growing ability of U.S. forces to execute operations with unprecedented speed and we (Americans) may choose our punches with great care (strategy), only to unleash them with blinding speed (operations, tactics)." 34 The evidence thus far appears to corroborate
Cebrowski and Barnett's position. One can look in any direction and see how deeply the aura of speed pervades American thinking. Speed is, of course, an idea located within the broader context of time. 35 Since the days of antiquity, attempts to illuminate the nuances of time have occupied the minds of scholars, philosophers, theoretical physicists and warriors alike.
According to some theorists, the aspect of time is rapidly becoming a critical dimension of warfare. 36 If true, then it follows that the concepts of time, and therefore speed, have shaped American thinking socially, politically and psychologically.
The Emotional Influences of Time. Historically, human beings have viewed time through both philosophical and emotional lenses. As time flows from the future to the past, humans move away from the "ambiguous" to the "recognizable." It is that uncertain future, that nebulous and ethereal context, which causes an almost primal fear to manifest in the minds of some people. "Will I get that promotion this round?" "How solid is my financial portfolio?" "How will I care for my family?" "Will a terrorist strike occur tomorrow, or the next day, or the next week?"
In his landmark book, The Direction of Time, Professor Hans Reichenbach discussed the "emotive significance of time," portending that time ultimately ends with one's death. It is this effect of nature that causes humans to associate the "fear of death" with a "fear of time." In Reichenbach's own words, "The phrase, 'passing away', by means of which we evasively speak of death without using its name, reveals our emotional identification of time flow with death."
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Although time actually remains relative, human perception translates "passing time" with speed and death, leading people to embrace the idea of "investing time." 38 Americans have adopted this belief with a passion. "Quicker" equates to "better" because tomorrow may never come.
Evolution of Temporal and Scalar Influences in American Strategic
Culture . The very first colonists who landed in the New World fled the old in an attempt to satisfy their need for religious and rural gratification. These settlers were free to practice their faith as they desired and to own vast amounts of land that the New World provided in abundance. However, living in the wild brought with it the needs of daily survival, and this formed the genesis of America's need for immediacy and self-gratification. The "now" became more important than the "future."
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The same phenomenon occurred as the colonies, burdened with over-taxation and tired of living under an unjust British ruler, choose the immediacy of revolution to rid themselves of England's yoke. In Europe, political reform required much more time. Americans wanted their freedom now, not later. The industrial revolution in the 18 th -19 th century in the U.S. also telescoped time.
As technology improved, Americans were empowered to do more. They could expand further westward and gain more land, build greater machines with even greater production capacities, and fuel the desires of a nation hungry for more wealth.
This increase in technology bolstered U.S. national capabilities, a fact seen clearly during the American Civil War. Beyond doubt, the Civil War was a conflict won on national capabilities, specifically economics leveraged against military might. At the beginning of the Civil War, the North laid claim to 23 states with a population of approximately 20 million. Conversely, the 11 states of the South had 9 million that included approximately 3 million slaves. 40 Even though this allowed more southern men to fight (instead of working at home), the North retained compelling superiority. For example, despite the fact that they had fewer slaves, Northern farmers were able to generate more edible crops than their southern analogue. Additionally, the preponderance of the nation's precious metals resided in the North. The Union was very adept in their management of banking, their creation of and ability to sustain factories supplying the war effort, shipbuilding, and their ability to use their expansive railway system to move supplies, men and equipment. 41 With their navy, the Union commanded the seas and thus egress to European factories and trade. Despite this Northern superiority, the South also enjoyed some advantages. Confederate territory was prodigious, and this would eventually cause havoc with the Union's supply lines and ability to mass forces. 42 The defensive nature of the Confederate strategy also forced upon the Union the need to occupy that land, thus placing further strain on the Union army and Union resources. In parallel, the South had its own impediments. The significantly smaller Confederate navy was vulnerable to Union blockades. Furthermore, the long southern coastline, while an asset for covertly moving desperately needed provisions, proved to be very difficult to safeguard. 43 Lastly, the deficient industrial base and factory production was the South's Achilles heel. 44 In the end, the North won the war because they were able to leverage their strategic advantages in economics and military capabilities against the several southern vulnerable points to claim victory. Technology was the enabler, and temporal acceleration was the resulting effect. Americans, for the first time in their short history, began to see strategic value in speed and temporal compression. 45 Technology continued to influence American perceptions of time and speed well into the next century. Gray noted many instances where "bias towards techno-centric warfare in U.S.
strategic culture" existed as seen by the dramatic increase in high-tech battlefield systems and Department of Defense trends favoring transformation through technology. 46 In her essay "Strategic Culture," Anita M. Arms noted, "By the mid 20 th Century, burgeoning technology was beginning to force a faster pace of life, a 'speed-up of change', and the development of a throwaway society." 47 Unlike their European counterparts, Americans possessed a "fascination with newness" that translated into people wanting the most updated, innovative, and revolutionary capability that money could buy. 48 Perhaps this explains why U.S. automobile companies build "planned obsolescence" in their cars, and why citizens replace cars on the average of once every 3-4 years. 49 The entertainment industry also played a role in reinforcing this mindset. Research demonstrates that television's pervasiveness has produced a "short term" focus in many western cultures with America leading the way. 50 Every night, people turn on their televisions and lose themselves in their favorite shows. Usually, within the span of one hour, actors explore, play out, and solve spectacular problems with relative ease and expediency. 60 The implications for that calculus can be staggering when planners of military strategy and national policy throw speed-oriented concepts such as "swiftly defeat"
and "rapid decisive operations" into the equation. 61 The essential point is this: Cultural notions of monochronic and polychronic societies can have profound differences that, if not taken into account when considering the use of speed in conflict, can affect a nation's ability to win both the "war" and the "peace". Now consider the manner in which polychronic cultures view the effects of time and speed. In essence, this type of culture seeks to embrace the "experience of time." When a temporal event occurs, it creates ripples that have second and third order effects. As these effects ripple outward from the initial point, the polychronic culture will seek to divine the meaning of that event through the lenses of history. These cultures reflect on each ripple, drawing insights and forming opinions based on what they saw in previous ripples of history. Each new effect that results as a consequence of the new ripples adds another layer of thought and reflection for polychronics, so their decision cycles are much slower to respond to changes in their environment. Figure 2 offers a visual representation of that perspective. 62 In this case, speed and temporal acceleration are seen as unfavorable. Inversely, the United States, being a monochronic culture, tends to desire a strong push for agendas, temporal management, and thus temporal acceleration / compression. Historical analysis and reflection may be superseded by the need for immediacy. Speed and temporal acceleration are seen as good in these cases.
Therefore, it is easy to see, in both cultures, how temporal thinking regarding compression and acceleration can affect political and military decision making. couriers on foot, horse, ships, and personal written communiqués between capitols and ambassadors" were the norm. 67 The slowness of speed had a regulatory effect on how events tended to unfold, and thus diplomacy was viewed as the "art of timing." 68 This tempo allowed the processes of diplomacy and democratic deliberation, which occur at a much slower rate, to run their course before the introduction of new data. Since sources of information were few, people had to adjust their chronometric perceptions, and thus their decision-making, to the information flows of the time. Today new advances in information technology capabilities have compressed that timeframe dramatically, allowing "shortcuts" through space that forms a temporal acceleration effect detrimental to the diplomatic process. In many cases, satellite communications and high-speed internet connectivity provide near real-time access to new information from the tactical and operational levels of a situation. Married to the instantaneity resident in American strategic culture, this causes decision makers to embrace courses of action that can ignore the democratic process, possibly resulting in a form of antidiplomacy that can derail the peace process. 69 This tracks with Colin Gray's assessment concerning the apolitical and astrategic character of American warfare, and his assertion that the nation tends to focus on military victory, sometimes at the expense of a lasting peace. 70 It also recognizes Gray's position that America's problem-solving character caused past leaders to believe in the "engineered fix" that ignored temporal considerations leading to policies and military action decisions that "attempt to realize the impossible." 71 Furthermore, it endorses the assessment that, although America's technological prowess and its ability to offer temporal compression alternatives for decisions makers may sometimes be "good", the speed offered by that apparatus could create pathologies in decision making that negatively affect a given situation. 72 For example, technology in large part helped America win the first Gulf War in less than 60 days. The air campaign commenced on 17 Jan 1991 and the cessation of hostilities was declared at 8:01
a.m., 28 Feb 1991. Aided by CNN, which dispensed the play-by-play of military activities throughout the campaign, American's began to equate "technologically advanced" and "speed"
with "good." 73 Lastly, the populace viewed the relatively low casualty rate experienced in that conflict as a by-product of the nation's vast technological superiority. Therefore, Americans began to believe that war, however ugly a concept, was sometimes unavoidable, and the expectation that high speed could always bring about the quick, decisive completion of war with extremely low causalities should be the norm. The nation's impatience and sensitivity to war causalities are reflective of its preoccupation with speed and temporal compression. 74 Studies conducted by author Theo Farrell supports this observation regarding casualty aversion. In his paper, "Strategic Culture and American Empire," Farrell explained that casualty aversion blossomed in Vietnam and has remained a factor in other conflicts to include Somalia and Kosovo. 75 The piquancy with speed and time remains immersed deeply within the American psyche.
Every day temporal and scalar perspectives influence American ways of thinking, direct behavioral patterns, shape cognitive insights and worldviews, and drive socio-political processes. By cosmic design or serendipity, these influences also shape how Americans employ the use of force against national security threats. Therefore, it is important to reflect on the dimensions of speed and time in war, and glean insights for managing them in the strategic context.
Speed and Time Assayed
Research presented so far emphasized both the nebulous (future) and immemorial (past) nature of time. This foundation makes it is possible to codify time as a "Quantifiable flow governed by the Uncertainty Principle in which events, some being manageable, navigate between the frames of the unchangeable past and the unknowable future." 76 Speed, it is not a subset of that scalar, as subsequent cases will allude.
Strategic Temporal and Scalar Pathologies in Combat: Cases and Examples
Obviously, there is some utility in employing each of the five types of speed in conflict.
Tactical speed remains critical for maneuver and is a primary tenant of Special Operations where delays expand vulnerabilities that can prevent special operators from gaining superiority over the enemy. 80 Decision-making speed can also be important at a variety of levels, regardless of whether the decision is made in the heat of an air-to-air fighter engagement or after a terrorist attack on a nation where failure to move quickly can convey a message of weakness to an adversary. Nevertheless, embracing the idea that speed is universally good in every situation can lead to failure. potential pathologies associated with speed and time in war, and they will be empowered to manage those dimensions in their operations more effectively. Of greater importance is the idea that leaders must understand the challenges that can result from failing to recognize those problems. Rigorous examination of several key military engagements has identified at least eight pathologies worthy of consideration. This led to problems much later in the campaign. 84 The looming threat of China offers an example of a potential conflict that will require "Continuous Concentric Pressure" (larger forces that require longer times to deploy and erect operations) rather than "Rapid Decisive Culture underscores how leadership attempted to use political rhetoric to control time and thus the speed of the pending conflict. The requirement for a "quick and painless war" drove the language of political speech-making and helped to shape an argument for rapid, decisive action in Iraq. 93 The problem with this line of thought is that it discounts the idea that a lasting peace sometimes requires a slower tempo in order to manifest. Speed may end the initial hostilities, but over reliance on speed can spawn conditions that fail to achieve national and strategic objectives. Jeffrey Record addressed this issue in "Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War," wherein he questioned how much effort American leadership is prepared to put into political and economic "nation building" or "nation-tending" of countries "toppled by American military power." 94 Even with so much emphasis on employing speed to get to the fight and win, it is also important to plan for the creation of a sustainable government that occupation forces will put into place once the hostilities cease. The lessons American military planners learned in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM support this. Nonetheless, the belief that "speed works all the time" lingers in military circles. 95 The improper employment of speed may also cause planners to miss opportunities for parallel or sequenced teaming between the Department of Defense and the interagency. This partnership is necessary towards laying the groundwork for nation building; failure to synergize that effort could lead to a reciprocal failure of setting conditions for strategic success. 96 Another factor to consider is speed and time in relation to the political process of other nations involved in Phase IV operations. A large part of U.S. national strategy orients on the prevention of failed states, as those tend to be hotbeds for terrorism. Therefore, the American demand for "conflict prevention and stability operations" will continue to grow at an increased rate as well, hoping to deter failed state creation. 97 At times, the focus on preemption speed and preventive war may not mesh with the political processes of likely coalition countries U.S. strategic leaders hope will stand with American fighting forces. For example, Cunningham and Tomes' research into space-time orientations and political thought recognizes that Persian Gulf cultures measure political progress quite differently than other Western cultures. 98 Failure to acknowledge this dynamic in the planning process can cause military leaders to employ a tempo that outpaces the political evolution. In effect, speed and time can potentially "compound foreign policy" efforts creating "spatial-temporal angst" and possibly "limiting our understanding, empathy for, and cultural insights" into other nations involved in the peace process. 99 The result could be strategic failure.
Another possible pitfall of speed relates to technology-assisted "bloodless warfare." In cases where the military uses tactical and operational speed so well to win the battle, there exists the risk of creating the false impression that speedy warfare equates to bloodless and risk-less conflict. Should political leaders equate these, they may assume that speed will always lead to a prompt, painless and successful outcome. This would be a dangerous assumption. Liddell Hart once wrote, "The object of war is to attain a better peace." 100 However, speed alone in itself does not necessarily lead to a better peace. In some situations, it can lead to opposite outcomes.
Problem #4: The Paradox of Strategic Speed and the Application of Military Power.
Sometimes the overwhelming need to get somewhere fast clouds strategic thinking about the employment of forces once they are in place. Ignorance and Sloth," discussed the benefits of Strategic Preclusion: A process that involves marshalling forces rapidly and moving them to points of conflict quickly. 102 Tucker explained when the American military did this in DESERT STORM, "Iraqi leadership saw a formidable force building and moving inexorably toward them." The goal was to reduce risk to friendly forces by creating psychological domination over an enemy. That psychological destabilization of the Iraqi forces was a crucial step toward collapsing the enemy's will to fight, and speed was vital in that effort. 103 However, to focus overly much on speed can preclude the strategic effect planners seek to achieve. Planners who fail to recognize this dynamic do so at the peril of mission success.
Problem #5: C4ISR Speed Accentuates the "Fog of War." At first glance, viewing C4ISR
speed as good may seem make perfect sense; instantaneous knowledge flow equates to faster decision making. However, by orienting towards a more nuanced vantage, one can see that things are not always as they appear. Virilio clearly identified with the instantaneity of technological speed and its associated problem sets. In his view, information technology eliminates distance and undermines both critical analysis and democratic politics, thereby damaging the requirement for traditional politics. 107 Tucker complemented this line of reasoning by indicating yet another major flaw in relying on this type of speed: The ubiquitous nature of C4ISR capabilities can generate an overwhelming amount of information that smothers decision makers in noise, friction and uncertainty during conflict. 108 Since information is available upon demand, strategic leaders and military commanders may actually delay their decision making until they obtain "perfect knowledge" so they can make a "risk-free" decision. 109 In some instances, those leaders may choose to completely ignore the information due to "knowledge over-saturation," and this defeats the primary reason for having the technology available: To improve clarity of thought for relevant decision making. 110 Excessive reliance on C4ISR speed also ignores the fact that the "enemy gets a vote" and a "thinking" adversary can and will do everything in its power to create uncertainty and fog with the goal of imposing his / her will regardless of overwhelming American military capability. 111 robotics, and autonomous / semi-autonomous computer-driven technologies on the battlefield significantly increase the speed of battlefield events, causing the many aspects of warfighting to "leave the realm of human senses and cross outside the limits of human reaction times." This implies that many on-the-drawing-board technologies may be "too fast" for cognitive thought (by humans) and will "create an environment too complex for humans to direct." 115 "Smart technologies" such as "self-healing networks", intelligent sensors, and machine-to-machine integration as identified in the Air Force's "Cursor on Target" initiative, will make humans more and more remote from the process, and this will pose critical issues and decisions for future planners. F.G. Hoffman paralleled this thought in "Transforming for the Chaordic Age" when he said: "American strategic culture incorporates technology and innovation as a critical dimension of our overall preeminence, but it is neither an automatic passport to strategic victory nor a cureall for weaknesses in other dimensions." Dysfunction", where he argued that certain applications of decision-making speed could actually cause decision paralysis when clarity is required. 117 David Tucker also confirmed this in his work. He agreed that fast decision-making is necessary in some cases, but believed that "some crises, such as a developing complex contingency operation involving the UN and a regional political or military alliance as well as the (Interagency) may require a slow decision making tempo. For shaping and preparing aspects of strategy in these types of situations, speed will be less important; especially if it impairs coordination." 118 Tucker also noted that, at the strategic level, decision-making is constrained by the need for consensus. This is especially true when one adds politics to the calculus, a process known for its lag time. planners must first create the conditions for successful interagency decision making that produces the effect of "coordinated rapid response to emerging problems" mapped to battlefield situations. 121 The inclusion of the Interagency is vital towards synchronizing strategic speed and decision-making speed in war as it allows military forces to multi-task anomalous situations that emerge from operations. As Americans learned in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, strategic preclusion may overwhelm some enemy forces while simultaneously creating smaller pockets of insurgency. Friendly forces will face multiple tasks spanning the spectrum of military operations, and they will need the interagency team to complete some of those tasks and secure the peace. 122 In short, both decision making speed and strategic speed will not necessarily be effective unless planners achieve interoperability with respect to the elements of national power. Moreover, they must also account for variable time and speed across the Interagency community and, where applicable, the coalition team. 123 Lastly, planners will need to weigh the relative importance of speed in these cases. have not yet met an adaptive adversary with the will and capability to compete with us on his or our terms" and that U.S. "technological superiority may prove less resilient than we imagine." 124 Since the fall of Communism, America has been relatively successful when plying its formidable military power against its enemies. Speed has been cited as one of the most important aspects of that military capability in many situations, especially in cases of preemption or preventive war.
However, future hostilities against non-state actors may prove to be a greater challenge. What will happen when America applies speed and firepower against an adaptable foe capable of operating as a "lateral network which can quickly learn from engagements, anticipate U.S.
strategy, and rapidly self-organize after being attacked?" 125 Will speed remain a critical advantage against such an adversary? As Cunningham and Tomes discovered, the rapiddominance based belief that speed and time used against an enemy "through surveillance and strike capabilities will eventually produce the collapse of the opponent's decision-making capability" may not always work and might actually undermine complete -or satisfactory or lasting -victory. In light of this, one might consider the Iraq War of 2003. In the early days of the operation, American forces used speed to engage and destroy a large portion of conventional Iraqi combat capability. 126 However, unlike U.S. actions in World War II, friendly forces in IRAQI FREEDOM did not linger to fully secure territories and establish "defeat" firmly in the minds of the enemy. Instead, they chose the allure of speed and continued to move forward to claim Baghdad. Shortly thereafter insurgents who did not realize they had been beaten rose up from the ashes and continued the fight against American forces. 127 In addition, this swiftness resulted in a form of "catastrophic success" that failed to achieve the peace and thus the national strategic objectives. 128 This phenomenon raises two critical points about speed: 1) The enemy forces and population must understand that they have been beaten. 2)
Despite the crushing capability of precision weapons, superior battlefield awareness, and the use of elite special operations forces, speed may allow rapid maneuver to break conventional enemy forces and still fail to set the conditions for strategic victory. 129 The American way of war, while often self-imposing temporal and scalar pressures on U.S. and allied / coalition military action, sometimes neglects to recognize that an enemy may be impervious to oscillations resulting from those pressures. 130 True, the management of tempo in battle remains a known asset. 131 However, if U.S. strategic leaders fail to start planning today for the adaptable enemy skilled at managing temporal and scalar shortcomings against friendly forces, American troops may find themselves vulnerable and exposed in future combat. -How can strategic leaders minimize the disadvantages of speed and time in the operation?
• What are the possible applications of speed and time that will erode the advantages?
• What temporal and scalar effects will cause the adversary to accept the imposition of your will?
• What temporal and scalar events will create the desired effects the national objectives require?
• What sequence of events can planners employ to best leverage the advantages of speed while mitigating the risks?
• How will the inclusion (or omission) of other actors (for example, the interagency) impact or be impacted by (type of) speed? • What are the political forces influencing the campaign and how will speed influence them?
• What factors or forces will influence speed and time in combat operations? Nation-building operations?
• Which types of (speed / time) actions will elicit a response and which ones will not?
• To which actions will coalition forces likely respond? Enemy forces?
• What are the tradeoffs of speed vs. greater political buy-in and legitimacy of the coalition?
• Are there differences in the speed of reactions depending on the nature of the action, nature of the actors, and nature of the enemies affected? 136 Temporal and scalar concerns are relevant issues, and models such as these can aid the astute national security professional in understanding the strategic implications of speed and time in war. That insight can be the difference between a lasting peace and strategic failure. With hope, military and interagency planners will take this to the next step and incorporate models such as these into the joint / national crisis action and adaptive planning frameworks currently in use.
Conclusion
There is much more to "speed and time" than meets the eye. The absence of scholarly debate on their relative values lends credence to the idea that American culture perceives speed as being a general "good." Since this can lead to varying pathologies of a strategic nature, comprehending the temporal and scalar implications of conflict remains vital for both politicians and military leaders who wish to shape the strategic landscape of American warfare.
The proposed strategic calculus for managing temporal and scalar mechanics in war gives national security professionals a more nuanced way of thinking about speed and time that has heretofore been unavailable. By considering the use of variable speed and tempo in certain situations, it offers a method for planning that can synchronize speed and time with the other elements of national power to win conflicts. Moreover, the calculus provides a unique perspective on the art of war, and those leaders who use it will be further empowered to ask relevant questions that refine and enhance warfighting concepts. In addition, by evoking intellectual debate concerning the implications of speed and time, the model can enhance longrange planning and help leaders achieve national strategic objectives in a variety of scenarios.
Decisions gleaned from this understanding can have a profound impact on how our nation will fight in the future.
Arguably, some people will have more difficultly coming to terms with this concept than others will. 137 Later in the article, the authors note that General Frank's plan to seize Baghdad "relied on speed" at the expense of manpower. 138 Did the "need for speed" overshadow a possible need for "variable speed" in terms of an operational pause? Just as Copernicus and Galileo ushered a paradigm shift into a world convinced that a geocentric theory of reality was closer to the truth than that of a heliocentric perspective, perhaps we may now try to usher in a rethinking of speed and time in war. 139 Clearly, mono-dimensional ideas about speed are not sufficient at the strategic level. 140 Although numerous lessons learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and other conflicts reflect the value of speed in multiple dimensions as "good and necessary," perhaps this research demonstrates that a compelling argument for slower or even variable tempo may apply in some cases. 141 Upon consideration of the pathologies aforementioned, analysts who cite speed success stories may choose to re-evaluate their views in light of those situations such as Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq and Afghanistan, which remain openended. 142 The future remains volatile and uncertain. National security professionals and scholarly institutions should be acutely aware of time and speed's strategic implications. Further research, analysis, and scholarly debate in this area can bring many of the temporal and scalar issues in war to the forefront. This may be one of the times where speed is of the essence, and those professionals should take decisive steps soon, before the adaptive enemy gets there first.
Endnotes
1 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). In Book 3 Chapter 12, Clausewitz talks about men, space and time as being vital components for consideration in the activity of war.
2 Anita M. Arms, "Strategic Culture: The American Mind", Industrial College of the Armed Forces, (January 1991). "American Strategic Culture" is defined by Colin S. Gray as a way of thinking and acting that "is the product of the significantly unique American historical experience (which) encompasses oscillations between extremes, and these extremes are quintessentially American."
3 Scalar is a term derived from physics and mathematics, and the first recorded use of the term was by Sir William Rowan Hamilton (4 Aug 1805-2 Sep 1865). Hamilton was an Irish physicist, mathematician, and astronomer who made enduring contributions to those fields prior to his death. When he introduced the term, Hamilton used scalar to denote a quantity typically characterized by a single numeric value or not involving the concept of direction. He used scalar to contrast entities that were composites of several other values such as vectors, matrices, tensor sequences (e.g. a generalized quantity or geometrical entity which includes concepts related to scalars, et al), mass, length, speed, etc. The term crosses the boundaries of physics and mathematics frequently. For example, in physics a scalar is a physical quantity that does not change under a change of coordinate system (a system for assigning a finite sequence [tuple] of numbers to each point in an n-dimensional space). In this respect, speed is a scalar (ex: 90 kph) and velocity (ex: 90 kph East) is a vector. It is not uncommon for people to use the terms of speed and velocity interchangeably. However, they are two very different concepts. Math and physics denote speed as the rate of motion or, more precisely, the rate of change of position commonly expressed as distance (d) advanced per unit of time (t). One can articulate speed in many ways: Meters/sec, Mach (approximately 343 m/sec), and the speed of light in space (c = 299,792,458 m/s) and so on. However, velocity is the physical quantity of an object's motion determined by both its speed and direction, or its vector. The distinction between the two is that speed is a scalar quantity due to its association with dimensions of distance and time, and it is considered the magnitude component of velocity. In Einstein's theory of relativity, speed is also considered to be scalar. Since relativity explores changes in coordinate systems within the domain of space-time, it also addresses the non-relativistic physics of fourth dimensional vectors that include concerns of speed and time. The point, in the simplest terms, is that when people use words such as "speed" and "velocity," they tend to focus on those concepts in the most general sense and this causes them to overlook the nuanced qualities of speed. Therefore, since speed has so many connotations, the term scalar will be used for the purposes of this paper to express the expansive quality of speed as it relates to time. The preponderance of mathematical and physics-related information in this endnote is available through the American Institute of Physics (http://www.aip.org/) and Wolfram Research Mathworld (http://mathworld.wolfram.com). 4 "VUCA" is a commonly accepted acronym used throughout the military academic community and services to denote the complex and chaotic environment in which strategic leaders make decisions. Jumper's "constructs" for this effort in detail. "Cursor-over-the-target" equates to the ability to select an object or person at will, study it, and quickly understand it. By melding this capability with other "science and technology" efforts, the Air Force seeks to control the battle space at will. CoT hopes to solve the problem of interoperability in the joint fight and replace the "human voice" in the Command and Control process where applicable. Note how this contrasts with the use of the words "long war" in the same document. It is interesting to note the paradox concerning the need to "swiftly defeat" within the context of the "long war." This implies that the United States' focus on speed produces mixed messages that confuse the public on issues concerning national policy and the attainment of national strategic objectives. 31 Quote taken from the movie Top Gun as dialogue spoken by Actors Tom Cruise and Anthony Edwards. 32 There are too many pharmaceutical companies to cite here. However, for the purposes of substantiating this point, a link to the Tylenol homepage is made available from http://www.tylenol.com/index.jhtml. Several brands of pain relievers seek to ease pain within 4-8 hrs. This is but one of the many company's that advertise to the American public. Additionally, according to A.C. Nielson Company and the Public Broadcasting System, the average American person has seen approximately 2 million 30-second TV commercials by age 65 (reference link available from http://www.csun.edu/~vceed002/health/docs/tv&health.html),
